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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 001100

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [KPKO](#) [CG](#)  
SUBJECT: SHORTLEY AND CHARGE DISCUSS EASTERN CONGO  
STRATEGIES WITH KABILA

Classified By: Charge S.Brock (1.4 b/d).

11. (C) SUMMARY. On September 14, 2007, Senior Adviser to Assistant Secretary Frazer for Conflict Resolution, Timothy Shortley and Charge d'Affaires, Sam Brock met with President Kabila at his residence for one hour to deliver the following messages from A/S Frazer. Kabila outlined his three phase plan to deal with Nkunda and FDLR and requested humanitarian assistance for displaced populations and those trapped in Goma by the current military positions. He also discussed his commitment to end the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) safe haven in Garamba Park as well as relations with Uganda, Rwanda and the Europeans. In conclusion, President Kabila asked the U.S. to be on stand-by for any diplomatic initiative regarding North Kivu; asked that we provide additional details for other elements of the U.S. initiative; support the Congolese plan to deal with Nkunda and the FDLR; and that we energize the U.N. to provide urgent food assistance to the war-affected populations in N. Kivu. END SUMMARY

12. (C) Senior Adviser Shortley delivered the following points to President Kabila:

-- The United States would like to intensify and increase bilateral relations in support of mutual interests of improving security and prosperity in the DRC and the region.

-- The United States would like to use our partnership to help the DRC extend its state authority and provide goods, services and protection to the people of eastern DRC in support of re-establishing civilian control.

-- The United States would like to help to increase the DRC's capacity to defend itself against negative forces in eastern DRC.

-- The United States is willing to hold direct dialogue with Nkunda to reduce tensions in N. Kivu and end the present conflict.

-- The United States is also interested in deepening our coordination with the GDRC, regional partners and the international community as a complement to the Tripartite Plus to deal with negative forces in eastern DR.

13. (C) President Kabila stated that "these messages are very timely and seem as if they are in reply to my meeting yesterday with the P3 2/MONU (U.S., UK, France and Belgium and South Africa and MONUC)." He cheerfully noted with a

broad smile that "this is a very happy coincidence." He said that he is very interested in the U.S. initiative and stressed that "we know what our needs are, what we want to do and how to do it, and need U.S. support." He continued, stating that "the biggest challenge is the war and humanitarian situation in North Kivu. North Kivu is the priority of all priorities right now."

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Kabila's Plan to Deal with Nkunda First and FDLR Second  
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. (C) President Kabila then outlined the three pillars of his strategy to deal with Nkunda and the FDLR, and stressed that he needs U.S. support for this plan at the Tripartite and beyond. President Kabila called President Mbeki to request South Africa's help as a facilitator. Mbeki agreed to lead the diplomatic initiative by pressing Rwanda to get Nkunda to accept the following three-phase plan (based on the Kigali agreement):

-- First, press Nkunda to accept exile in South Africa and allow his troops to be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated.

-- Second, integrate these forces into the Congolese Army and position them in areas previously held by Nkunda.

-- Third, prepare a joint Congolese and MONUC operation to engage FDLR.

15. (C) President Kabila said that the GDRC will not consider negotiations with Nkunda because of previous experiences where Nkunda ridiculed the Government and where direct

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discussions only served Nkunda's ego and public relations ambitions. If this plan does not work, there will be a need to go back to the drawing table because the situation cannot remain as it is. For the moment, President Kabila stated that "the U.S. should remain in the background for now as the South Africans have the ball and we can bring in the joint Congolese ) U.S. initiative as soon as it is needed." Kabila said that the situation in North Kivu can be described as calm, but without peace.

16. (C) President Kabila stressed that Nkunda is no longer a member of the Congolese armed forces and cannot be considered for integration. He emphasized that his actions on the ground, "to include atrocities and summary executions, do not allow him to be integrated into the Congolese Army." He said that "doing so would set a bad precedent and an outcry from the Congolese population." With regard to the FDLR, President Kabila noted that the international community must do more to deal with the FDLR in Europe and other continents and focus on alternatives to military action alone: apprehension of the five genocidaires and separation of the larger FDLR population; Amnesty, Repatriation and Resettlement for non-genocidaire populations; and third-country exiles.

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Request for Humanitarian Aid for North Kivu  
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17. (C) President Kabila said he was concerned about the "dramatic humanitarian situation for the people in and around Goma" and asked for U.S. assistance. The populations have not been able to plant this season and therefore will not harvest after the approaching rains. Further, food stuffs that come from Rutshuru and Masisi are now blocked because of Nkunda's forces and the people in Goma are very vulnerable to a prolonged crisis. President Kabila stressed that emergency food assistance from the World Food Program was critical to save lives and to alleviate the suffering of the displaced population and asked if the U.S. could help energize the United Nations.

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Lord's Resistance Army  
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¶18. (C) President Kabila said that he committed to both President Museveni and SRSR Chissano to demand that the LRA leave Congo in January if peace was not reached by end-December. He continued and said that he would like to have the capacity and ability to effectively deal with the LRA in January and that joint operations with MONUC are being prepared. He complained that the LRA is now killing and poaching the animals in Garamba and that they must be forced to leave. Kabila exclaimed "Kony has already over-stayed his welcome." He stressed that "while the GDRC and GOU will not plan a joint operation in the DRC, we can coordinate along the common border area with Uganda and the Government of Southern Sudan in case there is a spillover effect."

¶19. (C) Note. President Kabila said that he is dispatching Foreign Minister Mbusa and former Presidential Adviser Kapanga to Khartoum and Juba to discuss bilateral relations with the Government of National Unity (GNU) and wants to use the occasion to discuss the LRA and other bilateral issues (e.g., border demarcation). End Note.

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Relations with Uganda and Rwanda  
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¶10. (C) Shortley applauded President Kabila's recent agreements with Uganda and Rwanda and asked President Kabila how he assessed his current relations with both countries. Kabila said that relations with Museveni are "frank" and that confidence between Congo and Uganda is growing. Recent discussions in response to oil discoveries in Lake Albert and militia attacks along the border have effectively defused tensions and Congo and Uganda are now discussing the potential sharing of Ugandan-generated electricity. Kabila said that he is "upbeat" about Congo-Uganda relations.

¶11. (C) With regard to Rwanda, Kabila said that he thought

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the recent discussions with Rwandan Foreign Minister Murigande would "break the ice, but that it did not." He noted that "Rwanda is still very affected by genocide and tend to believe that everything they are doing is good, even though they are hurting people including populations in North Kivu. We must reassure them, that we are friends, not enemies. They continue to look at Congo with a suspicious eye. They still think that we are supporting the FDLR and we still think that they are supporting Nkunda as the new RCD." He concluded this part of the discussions by stressing that "no one can convince me that Rwanda is not providing direct or indirect support to Nkunda."

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The Europeans  
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¶12. (C) President Kabila noted European actions extending the UNSC resolution on restricting flow of arms to Congolese troops in eastern DRC. Kabila stressed that "the arms embargo has basically given Nkunda and other negative forces in eastern DRC the time that they need to regroup." He exclaimed that "we are a democratically elected government with the sovereign right to protect and defend the nation and I was shocked by the UK, Belgian and French position on the arms embargo." He said that he would explain his position during his upcoming visits to European capitals, but still asked that the U.S. "bring the Europeans back on track." He stressed: "I cannot explain to the Congolese people that I cannot protect our interests because of a UNSC arms embargo."

In Conclusion

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¶13. (C) President Kabila ended the meeting by stating that the United States can be very helpful by:

-- Remaining in the background for the next 1 to 2 weeks. If the South African initiative fails, I do not want all of us to fail at the same time. We will support a "direct and visible role for the United States as soon as the time is right." (Note. Kabila promised to update the U.S. prior to his departure for Europe next week. End Note.)

-- Outlining the other elements of the U.S. initiative to include: supporting inter-communal dialogue, extending State authority, re-establishing civilian control and providing security assistance. He stressed that he agreed with the principles but would like further details.

-- Supporting the Congolese plan at the Tripartite Plus meeting in Kampala. He stressed that he talked to President Museveni and "he will also support the plan one-hundred percent." He stressed that "we need U.S. support to immediately begin the three phased plan as we must act immediately."

-- Energizing the United Nations to provide humanitarian assistance to displaced populations in North Kivu.

¶14. (C) Mr. Shortley has seen and cleared on this cable.  
BROCK